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I.  Introduction 
The hedonic price regression continues to be a popular method for modeling quality-
differentiated goods, with common applications to housing, to recover marginal values for 
public goods, and to fast-changing products like electronics, to compute quality-adjusted price 
indices.  Because of its intuitive  appeal and ease of implementation, the model's popularity 
continues despite misgivings about its strong assumptions about the continuity of choices 
available to households in the amenity space.   
This paper explores the importance of such assumptions in practice with an 
application to hedonic housing prices.  Using a set of actual housing data to mimic a realistic 
city, and using a set of known preference orderings, it simulates a housing market to recover 
equilibrium prices.  It then performs hedonic regressions on these prices to assess the quality 
of the estimated marginal values for amenities, as in Cropper et al. (1988).  Despite good fit to 
the data, the mean marginal values are generally computed with large errors, typically in the 
range of 25 to 30 percent and sometimes much larger—even though there are no measurement 
errors or other data problems and no omitted variables.  Evidence is presented that, for some 
amenities with discrete distributions and/or lower priority in preferences, households with 
different demands cluster on similar amenity levels.  This evidence suggests that either not all 
marginal values can be priced into the equilibrium and/or that they are so discontinuous that 
even very flexible functional forms cannot identify them.  Relaxing the discreteness and 
structure in the urban environment overcomes these problems, allowing households to sort on 
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all amenities simultaneously.  The results suggest the need for caution in applying the hedonic 
method for recovering marginal values. 
II.  The Hedonic Model 
The hedonic model treats differentiated products as bundles of their underlying attributes z 
(houses as bundles of rooms, lots, neighborhood characteristics; cars as bundles of 
horsepower, handling, safety; and so forth).1  Households bid on the products based on their 
demand for the amenities offered, sorting themselves by preferred types.  This sorting results 
in an equilibrium price function, p(z), where prices are functions of the underlying attributes 
and determined by the supply and demand for those attributes.  It also implies that the slope of 
the hedonic price function at a point is equal to the marginal willingness to pay of households 
located at that point.  If households are all identical, it is exactly equal to households' bids 
(Freeman 1974); if households are heterogeneous, it is an upper envelope to their bids.2   
The hedonic model has been used both to forecast prices based on characteristics 
(using the price function) and to estimate implicit prices of amenities (using its derivative).  
Both approaches have been used to adjust price indices for quality change and new goods and 
to evaluate changes in public-good amenities for benefit cost analysis.  In applications to price 
indices, the derivative of the price function can be used to adjust prices for the change in 
quality (the current practice of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics), or the price function can be 
used to impute what the price would have been if quality had remained constant.  In 
applications to benefit cost ana lysis, the derivative of the price function recovers marginal 
values, while movement along the price function can serve as a bound for non-marginal 
values (Bartik 1988, Kanemoto 1988).   
As is well known, the hedonic model requires some strong simplifying assumptions.  
In particular, the production of products must be convex in amenities, so that any continuous 
quantity is available, even when conditioned on other quantities.  As the industrial 
organization literature has frequently pointed out, this means there is no space for the creation 
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of new differentiated commodities.  Or, to the extent it is used as an approximation when this 
condition is not met, the hedonic model implies that any products that do "fill in" the product 
space have no value (e.g. Trajtenberg 1990).  In some cases, this problem has motivated 
economists to use discrete choice models to estimate quality-adjusted price indices that 
account for new varieties in lieu of hedonics (Trajtenberg 1990, Nevo 2003). 
The crux of the problem caused by non-convexity is the "clumping" of heterogeneous 
consumer types on a single product.  When the choice set is convex and each type 
continuously available, each household-type will choose it's favorite product-type in the set, 
which in general will be different from those chosen by other household types.  The result is 
perfect Tiebout sorting in each dimension, where, ceteris paribus, those who prefer more of 
each attribute will purchase more of it.   
When the choice set is not convex, such perfect sorting is not possible.  Consider the 
simplest case where there are more household types than product types, but each type is still 
available in any quantity.  Suppose three household types have constant marginal willingness 
to pay for air quality of {$5}, {$10}, {$20}, with a mean marginal value of $11.67.  Suppose 
further that there are two house types (available in sufficient quantity to meet demand) that 
have air qualities of {0} and {1}.  Household 1 will locate in the first house type, household 3 
in the second, and household type 2 may locate in either.  Rents are maximized by charging a 
price differential for land of either $10 and collecting it on households 2 and 3 or $20 and 
collecting it on household 3 only.  In the former case the price gradient will understate 
willingness to pay, in the latter case it will overstate it. 
Clearly, when there is clumping of heterogeneous households, the determination of 
which household sets prices is crucial.  That determination, in turn, depends on the extent of 
Tiebout sorting of household by their demands for amenities.  Things can get more 
complicated when the stock of housing of each type is fixed exogenously.  Consider another 
case, now with two amenities (lot size and air quality).  There are three households and three 
houses.  The households have willingness to pay for the amenities pairs of {5,5}, {10,5}, and 
{15,8} (household 3 is the richest).  The houses, ordered to match their equilibrium allocation 
of households, have corresponding amenity quantities {1,1}, {2,1}, and {2,2}.  Equilibrium 
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prices are p, p+10, and p+18.  Because of the Tiebout sorting, in which discrete house types 
with the best air quality are chosen by households with the highest demand for it, the price 
differential for air quality is determined by the household with the highest demand for it, 
yielding a market value of $8 compared to the true average willingness to pay of $6.  
Meanwhile, the market value for lot size, at $10, is exactly right. 
However, suppose now the houses have amenity pairs {1,1}, {1,2}, {2,1}.  Then they 
will have the same matching to households,3 but with equilibrium prices p, p+5, and p+12.  
The market price for air quality, conditioning on lot size, is $5, compared to true average 
willingness to pay of $6.  Now, the household with the highest value for air quality no longer 
sorts into the house with high air quality.  That household also has the highest value for lot 
size, and prioritizes it over air quality.  Consequently, the market value for lot size is now 
higher than average willingness to pay, at $12 versus $10. 
Although such problems are well documented (citations?), they are sometimes 
overlooked in empirical work.  For example, Cockburn and Anis (1998) perform a hedonic 
regression over [small number] rheumatoid arthritis drugs.  They find that toxicity has the 
"wrong" sign in the regression.  However, the positive coefficient on toxicity can be explained 
by the fact that a small proportion of the population only responds to drugs of a certain type, 
which happen to be toxic.  Pakes (2001) suggests that the small market for these drugs is 
captured by a firm exerting market power, whereas competition in the larger market for the 
less toxic drugs keeps their prices down.  He concludes that, in practice, hedonics often belie 
the "naïve intuition that [desirable characteristics] should have positive coefficients."  Such 
intuition, he says, "was formalized in a series of early models whose equilibrium implied that 
the 'marginal willingness to pay equaled the marginal cost of production,'" a model which he 
characterizes as "very misleading" (p. 13).  In fact, however, the problem can be traced, at 
least in part, to the violation of the convexity assumption of the model.  There is instead 
separation in the drug types, as well as confounding between two amenities, potency (of a 
type) and toxicity. 
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Recent work in public economics has begun to emphasize the importance of 
discreteness or discontinuity in exogenous choice sets.  To identify values for school quality, 
Black (1999) uses a matching model to compare houses just on either size of discrete school 
boundaries.  In a more structural approach, Sieg et al. (2003) use a sorting model to recover 
values when households first sort into discrete communities defined by bundles of public 
goods, but then conditional on community can endogenously choose houses of continuously 
available sizes.  Others have used more traditional discrete choice models for individual 
houses (Banzhaf 2002a, Chattopadhay 2000, Palmquist and Israngkura 1999).  
Nevertheless, the classic hedonic price regression continues to be the most common 
approach to recovering marginal values for spatially delineated public goods, with air quality 
a particularly common application. 4  Perhaps one reason is that most public goods such as air 
quality, or any amenity defined by distance to a point, appear to be distributed approximately 
continuously.5  However, four points of caution need to be made when interpreting exogenous 
amenities that are seemingly continuous.  First, it is not enough that the amenity be distributed 
over a continuous support; the distribution itself must be continuous, for any atoms in the 
density of products will lead to clumping of potentially heterogeneous households at that 
point.6  Second, even if it can be thought of as being generated from a continuous distribution, 
any finite sample of houses will not be.  Third, even if the marginal density of the amenity of 
interest is continuously distributed, if the joint distribution with other amenities is not then it 
may cause difficulty for estimating hedonics in practice.  Although households should be 
sorted by their tastes for the continuous amenity after conditioning on the discrete amenities, 
conventional functional forms and even semi-parametric models may have grave difficulties 
identifying the price effects.  Fourth, and perhaps more practically, amenities such as air 
pollution, while generated by a continuous process, are often modeled as entering preferences 
in a discrete form.  For example, there are good behavioral reasons to model air pollution with 
the number of days that a point in space has exceeded a pollution threshold, since such 
information is often communicated to residents in this form through smog alerts and so on.  
                                                 
4 See Smith and Huang (1995) for a meta analysis and bibliography, and Banzhaf (2002b), Beron et al. (2000), 
Chattopadhay (2000), Chay and Greenstone (2000), Zabel and Kiel (1999) for more recent examples. 
5 See, for example, Palmquist (2003), note 25. 
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Clearly, though these exceedences are generated from a continuous variable (ozone readings 
at point in space and time), they are not themselves continuous.7 
The importance of such details about the structure of cities (distribution of amenities) 
has not previously been explored in depth.  This paper uses simulation exercises to gauge 
their importance for recovering marginal values using the hedonic technique. 
The Simulation Model 
The simulations in this paper follow an approach suggested by Deck (1987) and Cropper et al. 
(1988, 1993).  The basic idea is to define a set of households with heterogeneous incomes and 
tastes for housing amenities, define a set of exogenous houses, and find the equilibrium vector 
of prices that supports an assignment of households to houses.  These prices can then form the 
basis of hedonic regressions.  The estimated marginal values from the hedonic function, can 
then be compared to the true marginal values defined directly from (the known) preference 
functions.  Whereas Cropper et al. (1988) focused on the relative merits of various hedonic 
functional forms in their comparison, here the experiment is repeated over various city 
structures to gain insight into their importance in identifying marginal values for amenities. 
In the model, N households bid against one another to live in N houses which have 
already been constructed and are not open to adaptations or additions.  The households 
receive utility from a house h according to its exogenously determined attributes zh (including 
both structural attributes like the number of bathrooms and locational attributes like school 
quality and air quality).  They also receive utility from a numeraire commodity y.  Thus, 
formally, they face the following utility-maximization problem:  
 Max{h} U(zh, y; a)   ∋' 
 ph + y  ≤  I (1) 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 Moreover, there cannot be an atom at the left end of the support, even though it would be consistent with a 
continuous distribution.  
7 The problem is inherent in the definition of the commo dity, and not a question of measurement.  It is distinct 
from the measurement error that occurs from imputing values from the nearest measurement in space (as in the 
pollution readings at the nearest monitor) or from reported data that is averaged over space (as in crime rates by 
jurisdiction). 
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where I is income and a is a vector of parameters for the utility function.  Alternatively, this 
function can be written as 
 Max{x}  U(x'A, I-x'p; a) (2) 
where x is an Nx1 vector of binary demands, xh ∈ {0,1} and Σxh = 1, A is an Nxj matrix of 
attributes, and p is the Nx1 vector of housing prices. 
Define bhi(ui) as household i's maximum willingness to pay for house h when its utility 
is ui.  Equilibrium in this market is a vector of prices and of demands that satisfy: 
 ph
*  =  bhi(Ui (·))  if Xhi(p
*, y) = 1 (3a) 
  ph
*  ≥  bkj(Ui (·))  if Xkj(p*, y) = 0 (3b) 
 ΣiXhi  =  1 (4a) 
 ΣhXhi  =  1 (4b) 
for all i,h.  Conditions (3a) and (3b) state that equilibrium rent on a house equals the 
maximum willingness to pay of its occupant and that no household is willing to pay more for 
a house that it does not occupy than the household who does occupy it.  That is, there are no 
opportunities for trade.  Conditions (4a) and (4b) state that each household must occupy 
precisely one house, while each house must be occupied by precisely one household. 
On the housing side of the market, the simulations use an actual data set of 
approximately 40,000 Los Angeles houses that were on the market in 1990, a data set 
previously described in Sieg et al. (2003) and Banzhaf (2002a,b).  These data were used in 
order to have a realistic city structure.  They are described in more detail in the following 
section.  Each simulation samples N=1000 houses from this larger set. 
The household side of the market requires the specification of preference functions.  
For these preliminary results, utility is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas in the numeraire good 
and continuous housing attributes: 
 Ui(y, z)  =  ln(y) + Σj aij·ln(zj) + aidDd (6) 
where Dd is the dth attribute defined as an indicator variable (locational fixed effects or 
presence of a swimming pool, e.g.).  The utility parameters a are random across individuals, 
and normalized to the income parameter.  For realism, these parameters were estimated from 
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a discrete choice model described in Banzhaf (2002a).  Table 1 shows the parameters of the 
distributions.  As indicated in the table, some parameters are free to be positive or negative, 
some are censored at slightly positive (1% of the mean value), while educational variables are 
censored at zero.  The column "value share" gives a rough gauge of the importance of each 
variable; it is the marginal value of the amenity times the quantity, divided by the sum of this 
product over amenities (i.e., for amenity k it is MWTPk*zk/ΣjMWTPj*zj), all averaged over 
houses/households.  As can be seen, educational amenities are very important, while air 
quality is less so, and public safety, bathrooms, and lot size still less. 
In addition to the utility functions, each household is endowed with an initial income.  
Total household incomes were randomly drawn from a censored log-normal income 
distribution estimated from the 1990 census for Los Angeles area home owners.  The 
parameters of the distribution are µ=11.1 and σ2=0.4 and is censored on ($35k, $130k).  The 
median household income is thus $66,200.   
In principle, the economic equilibrium described in equations (3) and (4) can be 
modeled as a mixed complementarity problem.  However, characterizing the problem in this 
way requires solving N2+2N equations, which is not tractable for very large N (for N= 1000 
this is 1,002,000 equations!).  Instead, the problem was characterized as a linear program, 
requiring the solution of only 2N+1 equations, which was iterated to converge to an economic 
equilibrium.  The remainder of this section describes this problem in some detail; 
disinterested readers may skip ahead to the following section. 
The basic starting point is the assignment of N households to N houses.  The 
assignment problem is to choose an NxN permutation matrix P (with precisely one 1 in each 
row and each column and zeros in every other element) to maximize 
 Max{P} 1'1xN[bhi]NxNPNxN1Nx1 
There are N! choices of P, which even for a small sample becomes very large.  This makes the 
problem all but intractable.  However, Koopmans and Beckman (1957) showed that the linear 
assignment problem can be turned into a linear programming problem. 
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First, begin with some level of utility taken as a parameter.  At some starting value of 
ui( ) find the bhi (each household's bid for each house).  Then solve the following 
maximization problem: 
 Max{X} ΣhΣi bhiXhi   ∋' 
 Σh Xhi  =  1  ∀ i 
 Σi Xhi  =  1  ∀ h 
 Xhi  ≥  0  ∀ h,i (7) 
Here, Xhi is interpreted as the "share" of house h allocated to household i.  Unlike the demand 
vector in (2)-(4), in principle Xhi may vary freely and is not constrained to 0 or 1.  Hence, a 
very large linear assignment problem is turned into a linear programming problem.  But as 
Koopmans and Beckman note, the constraints in (7) do restrict X to a convex polyhedron, and 
a linear function defined over this region will find its maximum at a vertex.  Hence, the 
optimal Xhi will in fact be 0 or 1. 
While this procedure gives a solution to the linear assignment problem, at this point 
prices have not yet entered the picture, and we have done nothing to ensure conditions (3).  
That is, the solution may not be Pareto optimal.  To see how we can ensure this condition, 
first substitute (3a) into (3b): 
 bhi ≥ bki  if Xhi(p*, y) = 1 and if Xki(p*, y) = 0 (8) 
Wheaton (1974) identifies the duel problem to (7) as  
 Min{r, v} Σh rh + Σi vi   ∋'   ph + vi  ≥  bhi  (9) 
where vi is the side payment to household i needed to maintain utility levels and rh is the 
rental rate for the property.  By the rules of complementary slackness, we know rh + vi = bhi if 
(h,i) is in basis and rh + vk ≥ bhk if (h,k) is not.  It is easy to see that a sufficient condition to 
guarantee (8) is that vi = vk, since then, substituting  (vi = bhi - ph) for vk in (ph + vk ≥ bhk), we 
have bhi ≥ bhk.  Finally, to satisfy (3a), we need only set v = 0, so that the rental rate is equal to 
the willingness to pay.  This is possible since one of the 2n constraints is redundant, making 
the shadow values of p and v unique only up to an additive constant. 
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To obtain the sufficient condition vi = vk, Wheaton suggests the following iterative 
process.  First calculate (7) and (9) as above, with the bhi calculated from some reference 
utility.  Then normalize the vi so that they are all negative.  For the next round find the new 
level of utility for each household when they are living in the house assigned to it in the 
previous round and paying a price equal to its bid minus the side payment vi (which is 
negative).  That is, for all households i, at round t+1 find ut+1 to solve bh(t)i(u
t+1) = rh(t) where 
h(t) is the house assigned to i in round t.  Then in round t+1 recalculate the bhi matrix and 
again solve (7) and (9).  This process is repeated until t=t* such that vi ≈ 0 ∀ i at (9).  This 
approach iteratively raises bids until convergence is reached, although global convergence is 
not guaranteed at bids less than income or even at all.  The routine was implemented using 
GAMS's BDMLP routine for linear programming.   
Description of Data and Baseline City Structure 
As noted above, the housing stock used in these simulations is from a sample of homes sold in 
Los Angeles in 1990.  The amenities include fixed effects for county (Orange, San 
Bernardino, Riverside, and Ventura relative to Los Angeles); an indicator for proximity to the 
coast; neighborhood amenities for ozone (measured as days with an ozone exceedence), 
teacher-student ratios, achievement test scores, and public safety (renormalized from the 
crime rate); and physical amenities for the number of bathrooms, the size of the building, the 
size of the lot, the presence of a fireplace, the presence of a swimming pool, and the age of the 
house.  In the reference case, ozone exceedences are imputed to each home as the value at the 
nearest air quality monitor.  In a comparison case, it is imputed as a weighted average of the 
three nearest monitors, which gives rise to a more continuous distribution of air quality.  
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the data. 
Unlike empirical work, simulation exercises such as this raise no questions about data 
quality, since they are taken as true in the model.  However, understanding these data is 
important for understanding how households may sort in the urban structure of the model.  
Table 3 gives a first cut at a deeper understanding of the data by showing the table of 
correlation coefficients for all amenities.  It also gives the R2 from a reverse regression of 
each amenity on all others to gauge the independence of each amenity.  In general, 
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multicolinearity does not appear to be a severe problem, as none of the reverse regressions 
yield very high R2, at least not in comparison to the R2s of the hedonic regressions (see 
below).  However, there are distinct patterns to the data.  The table shows that bathrooms and 
buildings are the least independent due to their high correlation with one another (0.75).  Age, 
the two measures of ozone, and public safety are next, with R2s in the range of 0.45 to 0.58.  
All three of these variables are correlated with other spatial amenities, and age is also 
correlated with measures of building size. 
To go further into the discreteness and clustering of the data, Figures 1 through 3 give 
three plots of air quality, bathrooms, and building size respectively plotted against the 
teachers-per-student variable.  The sets of houses at each teacher level, defined by each school 
district, are unmistakable, as are the sets of air quality values defined by each monitor and the 
bathrooms defined in quarters.  Building size, however, seems to be available fairly 
continuously in each school district.  The extent of Tiebout sorting permitted with such data, 
and its implications for hedonic regressions, is explored in the following section.  
Results of Simulations and Hedonic Regressions. 
The simulations described above are performed with the housing stock as described above 
(the reference case), as well as for other scenarios designed to test hypotheses about the 
importance of urban structure.  For now, each scenario is repeated five times (additional 
simulations will be added in future drafts). 
To confirm the success of the simulations—and the importance of patterns of Tiebout 
sorting—an initial scenario was implemented with the baseline city structure and with 
complete homogeneity of households (identical tastes and incomes).  In this case, there is no 
question of clustering as the price of each house will differ from its neighbors according to the 
exact willingness to pay of all households.  In other words, the prices trace out the preference 
ordering.  The results of these simulations are summarized in Table 5.  The Table shows the 
average (over the simulations) of the percentage error in the estimated mean marginal 
willingness to pay relative to the true mean willingness to pay, for each amenity and for each 
of several specifications.  The specifications are the common log- linear form; a linear- log 
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form; translog I, which omits interactions with dummy variables; translog II, which includes 
all possible interactions; a Box-Cox regression, and a semi-parametric regression. 8 
As the table shows, the fit is good and the errors are generally very small in this 
homogenous case, especially in the log linear functional specification, as one would expect.  
Public safety is one of the hardest to pin down, but the percentage errors are on top of small 
true values, so the absolute errors are actually fairly small.  Age is the most sensitive to 
functional form, and is estimated correctly only in the linear- log specification.  The semi-
parametric regression performs badly here as it does in all the experiments to follow.  The 
problem with the non-parametric approach may be in the inability in these simulations to 
tailor the bandwidth to the data for each amenity-simulation combination.  Inspections of the 
non-parametric regressions suggest they fit the data well, but when under-smoothed oscillate 
around the trend in the data, generating negative marginal values alternated with very high 
values. 
As shown in Table 6, when heterogeneity is introduced into tastes and incomes the 
good fit continues for most models but matters get much worse for estimating marginal 
values.  Mean marginal values for building size and lot size, the most continuous of the 
variables, continue to be predicted well in the translog forms.  However, the errors in mean 
marginal values are much worse for the other variables, and often greater than 25%.  While 
errors of 25% or even more might be acceptable for much empirical economic work, it should 
be remembered that these errors occur with perfectly clean data, in specifications with 
absolutely no omitted variables, and in a context where we have assured that all households 
are in equilibrium.  Such large errors seem more surprising in such ideal laboratory conditions 
and can only raise questions about the use of hedonic regressions in practice.   
A review of the results in Cropper et al. (1988) shows that they too found large errors 
in marginal values for many amenities, even before introducing measurement error or omitted 
                                                 
8 The semiparametric regression uses a semilog model to parametrically difference out all amenities other than 
the amenity of interest in each row.  The procedure involves higher-order differencing described in Yatchew 
(1998), followed by locally linear regressions for the variable of interest.  Given the vast number of regressions 
run in the course of the many simulations, exploring sensitivity to bandwidth on a case-by-case basis was not 
possible.  Instead, the "optimal" bandwidth was used in all cases: 0.9*(N-5)*min{σ, IQR/1.34}, where IQR is the 
 13
variables into their hedonic simulations.  While they focus on the relative merits of various 
functional forms, the question posed here is what are the properties of the urban structure and 
resulting equilibria that drive such results. 
Figure 4a shows the extent of Tiebout sorting on a variable like building size, which is 
fairly continuous in the sample and whose marginal values are estimated well in the hedonic 
regressions.  The figure shows the matching of households, indicated by their taste for 
building size, to the size of the buildings they purchase.  The figure shows an unmistakable 
pattern of Tiebout sorting, with households who desire large homes outbidding others to live 
in them.  However, tastes are not the only factor at work.  Ceteris paribus, wealthier 
households are also more likely to outbid other households for larger homes.  Accordingly, 
there is similar evidence of matching by wealth and building size.  To combine both effects, 
Figure 4b shows Tiebout sorting with households indicated by their marginal willingness to 
pay at a fixed point (the mean of the data).  (The fixed point is required since otherwise the 
effect of diminishing marginal willingness to pay would create a downward sloping line.)  
Figure 4b indicates even stronger evidence of Tiebout sorting by building size.9 
Figure 5 shows the extent of Tiebout sorting, again represented by willingness to pay 
at a point, for the number of teachers.  Tiebout sorting is still clearly present, but there is also 
unmistakable clustering of heterogeneous households in the same school districts.  This 
clustering may account for the larger errors in estimating marginal willingness to pay for 
teacher ratios than for building size. 
Figures 6 and 7 repeat the comparison for air quality and bathrooms respectively.  In 
both cases there is strong evidence of clustering on the discrete values and indeed little visual 
evidence of sorting by demand for the amenities at all.  Again, this pattern of sorting may 
account for the even poorer performance in the hedonic regressions at predicting marginal 
willingness to pay for these amenities.  The pattern may result from a combination of two 
                                                                                                                                                        
inter-quartile range.  Marginal values were computed as the derivative of the kernel estimator with respect to the 
variable of interest. 
9 While incorporating information about income creates a tighter graph in this example, it should be noted here 
that this is not always the case.  While, holding income constant, households should always sort by tastes, 
holding tastes constant households might not always be able to sort by income for all amenities.  In some cases, 
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factors.  Unlike building size, the distribution of the data is fairly discrete, as discussed 
previously.  But relative to an amenity like the teacher-student ratio, which also comes in 
discrete units, these amenities are just not a priority to households.  Consequently, the 
households sort on other amenities and take air quality and bathrooms as something of a 
residual.   
Table 4 provides a non-graphical summary of such issues for each amenity.  For the 
reference case, it shows the simple correlation between each amenity and the marginal 
willingness to pay of households at a fixed point, their taste parameters only, and their 
incomes only.  As shown in the table, correlations are high for building size and teacher ratios 
but much lower for other variables and even negative for some locational indicator variables.  
These simple correlations may mask stronger correlations once other amenities are fixed.  
That is, heuristically, if households sort first into school districts, and if school quality is 
negatively correlated with air quality, we might not find a strong correlation between tastes 
and air quality, but we might still find such correlation within each school district.  In fact, 
there is little evidence for sorting on air quality even when conditioning on each school-
district/bathroom cell. 
Two experiments relax the structure of this urban environment in one amenity that is 
often of empirical interest, namely, air quality.  First, the measure of air quality in the 
reference scenario, the number of exceedences of the ozone standard at the nearest air quality 
monitor, is replaced by a distance-weighted average of the three nearest monitors, thereby 
smoothing the differences among homes and making the distribution more continuous.  The 
resulting distribution has approximately the same mean and is over a slightly narrower range.  
The simulated market was repeated with these data, along with the hedonic regressions and 
estimated marginal values.  The results of this experiment are shown in Table 7.  Surprisingly, 
the errors in the estimated mean willingness to pay for air quality are now even larger.  
Although this measure of air quality is more continuous, as shown in Table 3 it is also more 
correlated with other amenities.  This correlation may make it harder to sort on air quality.  A 
second experiment takes this set of air quality values and randomly distributes them to houses 
                                                                                                                                                        
households may use their income to purchase one amenity, which if negatively correlated with another would 
diminish the extent of Tiebout sorting in the second.   
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defined by their other amenities.  In this experiment, the relationship between air quality and 
space is completely severed.  As shown in Table 8, the error in mean marginal willingness to 
pay is now greatly reduced, and indeed less than 3 percent in all cases except the semi-
parametric model. 
A final pair of experiments replicate this same logic for all variables at the same time, 
though this time in reverse order.  First, while maintaining the same individual marginal 
distributions, all the amenities are randomly matched together.  That is, there is no longer any 
correlation among amenities.  The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 9.  The 
table shows that the mean marginal willingness to pay is now better estimated for every 
amenity, certainly for the translog specifications and almost for every cell in the table.  
Further, Table 4 shows that sorting is now stronger for every amenity with the exception of 
fireplace and swimming pool.  In some cases, the improvement is very large:  figures in 
boldface indicate changes of 0.05 or more.  Next, the amenities levels are randomly "spread 
out" from their previous values in such a way as to be continuous.  In this imaginary city 
structure, it is possible to be x% coastal, y% Riversidish, and z% San Bernardinish, to have 
any quantity of bathrooms on the real line, and so on. 10  As shown in Table 10, the results of 
this further experiment are more mixed, with some estimated values improving and some 
getting worse.  Interestingly however, the estimated marginal values for bathrooms, the most 
discrete of the variables, does improve dramatically. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Clearly, the two pairs of experiments together suggest that the spatial structure of the data is 
more important than discreteness, at least in the case of air quality.  Two possible econometric 
factors bear consideration here.  First, any problem of estimating the parameters due to 
multicolinearity is overcome when the data are randomly distributed.  Second, any correlation 
in the error structure is also overcome.  Such correlation has been of increasing interest in 
hedonic models (e.g. Bell and Bockstael 2000).  However, to the extent it is an empirical issue 
related to spatially distributed measurement error or unobservables, this explanation can be 
                                                 
10 It is not a mean-preserving spread, but rather ma intains the range of the original data (e.g., indicator variables 
are no longer only zero or one, but are still bounded by zero and one). 
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ruled out for these controlled simulations.11  Furthermore, both of these econometric issues 
relate to the efficiency in the estimation, but the results of the reference case (Table 6) suggest 
bias is a problem [although, at this point, 5 repetitions is not really sufficient to say so with 
confidence].   
A more plausible explanation lies in the economic structure of the problem.  As 
stressed previously households do not sort on air quality in any discernable way, even when 
conditioning on large cells.  Table 4 provides weak evidence that households better sort on air 
quality when it is divorced from other amenities.  The correlation between air quality and the 
corresponding taste parameter increases from 0.289 to 0.371 in this experiment, although 
correlation with income actual declines.  Because air quality is apparently a low priority, 
households heuristically sort based on other amenities, and then sort on air quality based on 
what is available at that point.  The result is great variation in willingness to pay along the air 
quality line.  To some extent, this is partly a question of more flexible functional forms.  But 
viewed another way it is more radical.  Interactions can account for linear trends with other 
amenities, but not discontinuous relationships.  There may not be any sense in which a finite 
set of houses can generate a smooth function of marginal values on air quality when there is 
this kind of dependence.  Over a narrow range price differentials must be tied down by a set 
of households with potentially very different demands, a kind of clustering generalized from a 
single value to a neighborhood. 
The emphasis here is on marginal values.  As noted previously, price levels are 
predicted very well, with large R2s and small mean square errors.  To some extent, this 
emphasizes old concerns about evaluating models purposed for welfare measurement based 
on criteria of fit (Smith 1990).  It also lends support to consideration of traditional logit 
models and newer discrete or discrete-continuous sorting models as an alternative. 
 
                                                 
11 Likewise, there is no structural reason for any spatial lagged dependence, since the prices are determined 
independently.   
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Table 1.  Utility Parameters for Each Variable 
 Mean Std Dev Censored? Value Share 
Orange Co -0.177 0.017 No -5.4% 
Riverside Co -0.374 0.037 No -11.4% 
San 
Bernardino -0.354 0.35 No -10.8% 
Ventura Co -0.074 0.0074 No -2.3% 
Coast 0.520 0.052 Zero 13.0% 
Days w/o 
Ozone Alert 0.405 0.041 1 percent 12.3% 
Teachers per 
student 1.309 4.84 Zero 35.0% 
Test Score 0.914 0.085 Zero 27.9% 
Public Safety 0.172 0.349 1 percent 6.9% 
Bathrooms 0.056 0.046 1 percent 1.8% 
Building size 
(sq ft) 0.511 0.427 
1 percent 
15.0% 
Lot size (sq ft) 0.107 0.0162 1 percent 3.3% 
Fire place 0.077 0.0077 Zero 2.3% 
Pool 0.078 0.0078 Zero 2.4% 
Age -0.0059 00321 No -0.2% 
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Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of Underlying Housing Data 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Orange Co 0.1280 -- 0 1 
Riverside Co 0.1783 -- 0 1 
San 
Bernardino 0.1227 -- 0 1 
Ventura Co 0.0693 -- 0 1 
Coast 0.0116 -- 0 1 
Days w/o 
Ozone Alert 315 38 241 364 
Teachers per 
student 4.052 0.174 3.509 5.780 
Test Score 4.891 0.511 3.78 6.78 
Public Safety 2,387 157 412 2,852 
Bathrooms 2.005 0.666 0.5 6 
Building size 
(sq ft) 1588 535 504 4934 
Lot size (sq ft) 8,383 6,715 540 99,752 
Fire place 0.6034 -- 0 1 
Pool 0.1475 -- 0 1 
Age 26.12 20.20 1 94 
Based on 39,347 housing in the Los Angeles area. 
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Table 3.  Correlation and Multiple Correlation Among Amenities 
 R2 Ornge Rivrsd San Bern Ventra Coast 
Ozone  
(Nbr) 
Ozone 
(wt) Teach Test  Safety Baths Buildg Lot  
Fire 
place Pool Age 
Orange Co 0.43 1.00                
Riverside Co 0.42 -- 1.00               
San 
Bernardino 0.24 -- -- 1.00              
Ventura Co 0.30 -- -- -- 1.00             
Coast 0.03 0.09 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 1.00            
Days w/o 
Ozone Alert 
(nbr) 
0.50 0.37 -0.27 -0.48 0.28 0.12 1.00           
Days w/o 
Ozone Alert 
(wt) 
0.58 0.39 -0.31 -0.52 0.29 0.13 (0.95) 1.00          
Teachers per 
student 0.08 0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.18 0.19 1.00         
Test Score 0.38 0.53 -0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.06 1.00        
Public Safety 0.45 0.08 -0.42 -0.08 0.42 0.01 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.30 1.00       
Bathrooms 0.66 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 0.18 0.19 1.00      
Building size 
(sq ft) 0.63 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.18 0.22 0.75 1.00     
Lot size (sq ft) 0.15 -0.09 0.17 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.27 1.00    
Fireplace 0.27 -0.31 0.26 0.18 0.10 -0.06 -0.26 -0.28 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 0.25 0.27 0.11 1.00   
Pool 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.13 0.11 1.00  
Age 0.58 -0.03 -0.40 -0.23 -0.12 0.07 0.27 0.30 0.14 -0.17 -0.06 -0.56 -0.41 -0.11 -0.25 -0.07 1.00 
R2 is the coefficient of determination in a regression of each amenity on all others.  (Ozone-nbr is used on the right-hand side for non-ozone 
variables.) 
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Table 4.  Index of Tiebout Sorting by Amenity 
 Reference Case  
Air Quality 
Independent, 
Continuous 
All  
Independent 
All 
Independent, 
Continuous 
 
MWTP 
at 
Mean 
Taste 
Parameter Income 
MWTP 
at 
Mean 
Taste 
Parameter 
MWTP at 
Meanr 
Taste 
Parameter 
MWTP at 
Mean 
Taste 
Parameter 
Orange Co -0.028 0.293 0.123 0.028 0.280 0.193 0.338 0.123 0.313 
Riverside 
Co 0.413 0.328 -0.353 0.405 0.349 0.431 0.415 0.440 0.444 
San 
Bernardino 0.354 0.311 -0.298 0.319 0.363 0.341 0.373 
0.417 0.401 
Ventura Co -0.147 0.120 0.200 -0.098 0.127 0.040 0.191 0.011 0.124 
Coast 0.279 0.105 0.234 0.269 0.119 0.272 0.141 0.498 0.426 
Days w/o 
Ozone 
Alert 
0.413 0.289 0.346 0.330 0.371 0.272 0.322 0.302 0.227 
Teachers 
per student 0.768 0.753 0.187 0.768 0.755 0.776 0.775 0.841 0.838 
Test Score 0.553 0.349 0.469 0.523 0.362 0.518 0.414 0.463 0.423 
Public 
Safety 0.613 0.537 0.431 0.608 0.538 0.588 0.620 0.686 0.705 
Bathrooms 0.497 0.407 0.332 0.501 0.404 0.593 0.652 0.557 0.586 
Building 
size (sq ft) 0.935 0.800 0.436 0.935 0.795 0.936 0.855 0.898 0.865 
Lot size (sq 
ft) 0.317 0.324 0.188 0.342 0.325 0.338 0.335 0.420 0.471 
Fire place 0.198 0.258 0.128 0.222 0.276 0.236 0.266 0.105 0.178 
Pool 0.348 0.223 0.289 0.360 0.237 0.185 0.216 0.180 0.156 
Age 0.654 0.701 0.011 0.661 0.707 0.753 0.778 0.661 0.687 
Bold figures highlight movements of +/-0.050 or more in corresponding figure from previous model. 
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Table 5. Percentage Errors in Estimated Mean Willingness to Pay  
(Homogenous Households) 
 Specification 
Amenity 
Log-
linear 
Linear-
Log 
Trans 
log I 
Trans 
log II 
Box-
Cox 
Semi-
Parametric 
Air Quality -5.4% 1.1% 3.1% 3.7% 1.4% -43.9% 
Teachers/Student 1.6% 0.2% -0.4% -0.4% 1.6% -30.8% 
Test Score -7.4% -2.7% -1.7% -0.5% -6.3% -23.1% 
Public Safety 94.6% 16.4% 15.8% -6.7% 52.3% 30.0% 
Bathrooms 23.1% -3.4% -16.2% -3.3% 5.2% -77.0% 
Building Size -20.3% -2.7% 1.2% -0.3% -9.7% -1.8% 
Lot Size -65.6% -3.0% -0.9% 0.0% -25.3% -8.4% 
Age -57.1% 4.7% 132.3% 67.9% -40.7% -47.1% 
R2 0.943 0.998 0.992 0.998 -- -- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Percentage Errors in Estimated Mean Willingness to Pay  
(Reference Case) 
 Specification 
Amenity 
Log-
linear 
Linear-
Log 
Trans 
log I 
Trans 
log II 
Box-
Cox 
Semi-
Parametric 
Air Quality -26.4% -14.4% -6.4% -25.6% -8.6% -22.6% 
Teachers/Student -30.5% -21.9% -11.7% -12.4% -30.9% -57.8% 
Test Score 13.5% 23.9% 13.0% 4.8% 12.7% -25.4% 
Public Safety -105.0% -166.0% -49.7% -36.8% -114.1% -97.1% 
Bathrooms -34.9% -94.3% -14.4% -21.2% -83.9% -76.1% 
Building Size 24.9% 41.9% 4.1% 3.8% 24.6% 6.0% 
Lot Size -57.5% 36.9% 1.5% -1.0% 25.5% -12.0% 
Age -95.9% -36.3% -21.9% -7.7% -29.9% -89.6% 
R2 0.937 0.863 0.988 0.991 -- -- 
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Table 7. Percentage Errors in Estimated Mean Willingness to Pay  
(Continuous Air Quality) 
 Specification 
Amenity 
Log-
linear 
Linear-
Log 
Trans 
log I 
Trans 
log II 
Box-
Cox 
Semi-
Parametric 
Air Quality -34.3% -15.8% -11.8% -35.2% -9.4% -38.5% 
Teachers/Student -30.0% -21.4% -10.9% -12.1% -30.6% -58.0% 
Test Score 13.7% 24.3% 13.5% 6.1% 12.9% -26.2% 
Public Safety -106.9% -165.9% -47.2% -39.5% -114.0% -99.1% 
Bathrooms -35.7% -94.8% -14.7% -21.6% -83.9% -75.4% 
Building Size 25.2% 42.0% 4.1% 4.0% 24.9% 5.8% 
Lot Size -57.5% 37.3% 0.9% -1.2% 25.6% -13.9% 
Age -96.1% -36.6% -22.0% -8.6% -29.9% -90.3% 
R2 0.937 0.862 0.988 0.991 -- -- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Percentage Errors in Estimated Mean Willingness to Pay  
(Independent, Randomly Distributed Air Quality) 
 Specification 
Amenity 
Log-
linear 
Linear-
Log 
Trans 
log I 
Trans 
log II 
Box-
Cox 
Semi-
Parametric 
Air Quality -1.3% 3.0% -2.8% -1.4% -2.0% -21.8% 
Teachers/Student -31.5% -22.4% -12.5% -14.8% -30.8% -59.1% 
Test Score 13.2% 23.6% 14.4% 6.6% 12.1% -22.7% 
Public Safety -96.5% -156.3% -44.8% -38.9% -109.5% -82.5% 
Bathrooms -32.0% -94.7% -12.6% -17.0% -82.1% -74.7% 
Building Size 23.7% 40.2% 3.2% 2.5% 23.1% 4.7% 
Lot Size -55.7% 42.6% 3.6% 3.9% 27.8% -8.8% 
Age -95.2% -32.2% -18.2% -8.4% -27.9% -88.4% 
R2 0.933 0.857 0.987 0.994 -- -- 
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Table 9. Percentage Errors in Estimated Mean Willingness to Pay  
(Independent, Randomly Distributed Variables) 
 Specification 
Amenity 
Log-
linear 
Linear-
Log 
Trans 
log I 
Trans 
log II 
Box-
Cox 
Semi-
Parametric 
Air Quality -5.9% -5.7% -3.7% -2.8% -7.5% -28.5% 
Teachers/Student -24.7% -22.8% -4.1% -4.7% -28.6% -57.1% 
Test Score -3.5% 4.4% -3.3% -1.9% -0.1% -28.0% 
Public Safety -14.6% -22.3% -1.0% 5.5% -23.5% -10.5% 
Bathrooms -10.6% -20.0% -10.6% -11.2% -18.0% -83.6% 
Building Size 13.3% 27.1% -1.0% -1.5% 17.8% -6.2% 
Lot Size -51.3% 19.9% 0.2% 3.2% 8.6% -8.1% 
Age -90.8% -54.6% 2.0% 2.4% -61.8% -88.9% 
R2 0.881 0.796 0.973 0.979 -- -- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Percentage Errors in Estimated Mean Willingness to Pay  
(Independent, Randomly Distributed Continuous Variables) 
 Specification 
Amenity 
Log-
linear 
Linear-
Log 
Trans 
log I 
Trans 
log II 
Box-
Cox 
Semi-
Parametric 
Air Quality -2.26% 0.91% -5.68% -3.37% -1.95% -7.09% 
Teachers/Student -15.59% -12.49% -12.22% -13.23% -16.97% -9.53% 
Test Score 4.14% 7.21% 1.33% 0.57% 4.13% -2.65% 
Public Safety -19.15% -23.91% -11.62% -10.55% -22.25% -19.66% 
Bathrooms 2.78% 5.49% 4.75% 1.39% 0.12% -4.40% 
Building Size -1.83% -4.37% -7.35% -7.28% -8.02% -8.20% 
Lot Size -9.96% 8.09% -0.66% -0.15% 2.95% -15.30% 
Age -60.44% -1.62% 12.75% 10.40% -14.74% -42.22% 
R2 0.904 0.831 0.976 0.983 -- -- 
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Figure 1.  Air Quality versus teacher-student ratio (reference scenario).   
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Figure 2.  Bathrooms versus teacher-student ratio (reference scenario).   
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Figure 3.  Building size versus teacher-student ratio (reference scenario).   
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Figure 4a.  Sorting on Building Size:  Taste Parameter Matched to Amenity Levels 
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Figure 4b. Sorting on Building Size:  Marginal WTP (at mean) matched to Amenity 
Levels 
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Figure 5.  Sorting on Teachers:  Marginal WTP (at mean) vs. Amenity Levels 
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Figure 6.  Sorting on Air Quality:  Marginal WTP (at mean) vs. Amenity Levels 
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Figure 7.  Sorting on Bathrooms:  Marginal WTP (at mean) vs. Amenity Levels 
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